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ORGANIZATIONAL ETHOS AND
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
HENRY J. AMOROSO*
The quintessential principal of corporate governance is that
the corporation's business should be conducted in order to enhance
corporate profit and shareholder gain. Traditionally, corporations
have been required to act within the boundaries established by the
law and have been permitted to take into account ethical considera-
tions that are reasonably regarded as appropriate for the conduct
of the business. Professor Amoroso canvasses the case law and
literature addressing the standard of corporate criminal liability
and hypothesizes that the recently enacted Chapter Eight of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines will ensure that organizational eth-
ics will assume a more significant role in the conduct of corporate
business. Chapter Eight will encourage the establishment of inter-
nal ethics mechanisms, will ensure that compliance with ethical
codes will no longer be dismissed as irrelevant by the courts, and
may encourage a movement away from traditional standards of
corporate criminal liability by encouraging firms to actively detect
and discourage corporate misconduct.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate execu-
tive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct
the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will
be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom.1
This quotation embraces the fundamental principle that the
corporation "should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and share-
holder gain."2 Regardless of whether corporate profit and share-
holder gain are enhanced, the corporation is obliged to act within
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University, S. Orange, New Jersey.
1. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32, 33.
2. THE AmmcAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
§ 2.01(a) (Proposed Final Draft) (Mar. 31, 1992).
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the boundaries of the laws and "may take into account ethical con-
siderations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate for the
responsible conduct of the business."3 This may include devoting
a reasonable amount of resources to the public welfare and other
humanitarian and philanthropic purposes.4
The American Law Institute's (hereinafter "ALP') Principles
of Corporate Governance section 2.01 does not impose a legal obli-
gation to take ethical considerations into account because such. an
obligation might be too onerous or imprecise to enforce fairly.
Rather, the ALI permits corporations to use ethical concerns to
explain actions that would otherwise be viewed by shareholders
with skepticism.
This Article evaluates a separate and rapidly emerging facet
of corporate governance. This facet involves the reliance upon
ethical precepts and internal corporate ethical mechanisms in the
guidance of a firm away from industrial impropriety. Although
during its infancy corporate ethics found expression in the sparse
language of such statutes as the ALI, cited above, as well as some
esoteric and relatively "toothless" decisional law, the United
States Sentencing Commission recently has decided that internal
and organizational ethics will assume a more significant role in
the conduct of daily corporate affairs.5
This Article begins with a brief analysis of traditional case
law surrounding the standards of corporate criminal liability and
the liability of individual corporate- officers or members of the
board of directors. Each of these will be viewed with an eye
towards factors that courts have traditionally relied upon in deter-
mining criminal liability. An underlying theme is the body of law
governing corporate criminal liability has not adequately met the
goals of our criminal statutes; namely, specific and general deter-
rence and a cure for the societal harm resulting from the criminal
activity. A secondary theme is the significant strides made by
Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in directing
corporate organizational behavior towards greater compliance
with ethical standards and criminal statutes. Following the analy-
sis of the law is an evaluation of the existing literature regarding
the sentencing trends and the inherent problems of the previous
sentencing scheme. The Article will also review the existing dia-
3. Id. at § 2.01(b).
4. Id.
5. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MAN. (Nov. 1994)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.], ch. 8, reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West. Supp. 1994).
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logue concerning the efficacy and practical considerations in hold-
ing corporations criminally liable, as well as the economic,
managerial, and theoretical limitations.
Chapter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines (hereinafter
"Chapter Eight") was drafted to encourage organizations to estab-
lish internal ethics mechanisms and heed the tenets of ethical
codes, to restrengthen the deterrent and curative powers lacking
in the present body of corporate criminal law, and to foster within
the corporation a renewed cognizance of the need for operational
ethos throughout the daily activities of the corporation. These
goals will be effectuated by a modification of the traditional corpo-
rate organizational structure, specifically through the creation
and/or enhancement of the role of a corporate ethics officer. Such
a revised role will be an active one because of a firm's desire to
capitalize on the mitigating factors found in the Sentencing
Guidelines. This will raise the level of accountability for the
actions of a corporation as well as its employees, and it will facili-
tate the means by which a firm may discover and prevent criminal
behavior. Most significantly, it will provide a firm with an objec-
tive mitigating factor that will either affect the imposition of crim-
inal liability or at least the magnitude of sanctions assessed.
Chapter Eight also will encourage a movement away from
historical standards of corporate criminal liability. These stan-
dards traditionally have required overt corporate violation of the
penal code or tolerance or ratification of criminal activity, under a
theory of respondeat superior. The Sentencing Commission has
suggested to the courts the need to make corporate organizations
responsible for detecting and preventing the criminal conduct
committed by its employees or agents. This is a significant depar-
ture from the passive "foreseeability-negligence" standard to the
proactive policing of its own ranks.6 This discussion, in addition,
addresses the substance of Chapter Eight, including the legisla-
tive history surrounding the enactment, its precise text and appli-
cation of the "culpability formula,"7 and the anticipated impact it
will have on corporate organization and behavior.
II. TRADITIONAL THEORY OF CoRPoRATE LLBILITY
Traditionally, corporations retained a unique "entity" status
akin to that of a "person" within the meaning of statutes making
6. See infra text accompanying notes 15-25.
7. See infra text accompanying note 103.
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certain acts by "persons" an offense. However, the term "persons"
as used in a criminal statute does not include corporations where
it is not the intent or purpose of the statute to do so. Neverthe-
less, a provision in a general construction statute may extend the
term to corporations.' This is especially evident where another
applicable statute, such as the general definition section of a penal
code, so provides.9
Thus, a corporation can be prosecuted for violating a penal
statute, 10 and may further be held criminally liable if agents or
employees who have the power to bind the corporation engage in
the requisite criminal behavior." Under one view, since a corpora-
tion may be punished by a fine but not imprisonment, where the
only penalty prescribed for the violation of a criminal statute is
imprisonment or death, a corporation cannot be prosecuted under
such a statute. l2 In the presence of a monetary sanction, however,
the corporation may be prosecuted whether or not an alternative
penalty of imprisonment is prescribed.13 In some jurisdictions, a
court may sentence a corporation to serve a term of years, and
since such a sentence is incapable of enforcement, it may suspend
that sentence and impose a fine. 1 4
A corporation may be held criminally responsible for the acts
of its officers, agents, or employees under the theory of respondeat
superior. Corporations are particularly susceptible when their
officers, agents or employees act within the scope of their employ-
ment and, at least in part, for the benefit of the corporation.' 5
Despite possessing rights and obligations which are separate
and apart from those belonging to individual stockholders, a firm
may be severally liable with its officers for crimes committed by
8. First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 206 F. 374 (8th Cir. 1911).
9. United States v. Houghland Barge Line, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1110, '1113
(W.D. Pa. 1974).
10. State v. Shepherd Constr. Co., 281 S.E.2d 151, 156 (Ga.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1054, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1074 (1981).
11. Jones v. Fenton Ford, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 1328, 1336 (D. Conn. 1977).
12. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926 (8th Cir. 1914), aff'd.,
236 U.S. 531 (1915).
13. Id.
14. Shepherd Constr. Co., 281 S.E.2d at 156-57.
15. United States v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 770 F.2d 399,406 (4th Cir.
1985); United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1195 n.7 (8th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 991 (1982).
[Vol. 17:47
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such officers on behalf of the corporation.' 6 Thus, a corporation
may be prosecuted along with its officers, and both the agent and
the corporation may be convicted where the agent, in the course of
the employer's business, obtains anything of value for the corpora-
tion by the illegal conduct. 7
Additionally, a corporation may be held criminally liable for
actual or apparent acts committed by its agents, provided such
acts were committed within the course of their employment or the
scope of their authority. Such acts may be imputed to the corpora-
tion, even if they are forbidden and against corporate policy or
express instructions.'" Many jurisdictions have created agency
liability by characterizing those instances where the agent per-
forms acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform as "within
the scope of employment." These acts must be substantially
within the authorized limits of time and space, and they must be
motivated, at least in part, by an intent to benefit the corporation,
or to benefit the agent first and the corporation second. 19
"Apparent authority" is the authority that an outsider would
normally assume the agent to possess, judging from the agent's
position within the company and the circumstances surrounding
his or her past conduct.20 Title or position of an individual in the
corporation, however, is not conclusively determinative in ascrib-
ing criminal responsibility to the corporation for an agent's acts.
Additional factors to consider in determining a corporation's crim-
inal responsibility for the acts of its agent include: 1) the extent of
control and authority exercised by the individual over and within
the corporation; 2) the extent and manner to which corporate
funds were used in the crime; and 3) a repeated pattern of crimi-
nal conduct tending to indicate corporate toleration or ratification
of the agent's acts.2 ' It is not essential that the particular acts be
expressly authorized by the corporation. It has been held, how-
ever, that in order to charge a corporation with liability for the
16. United States v. Rodgers, 624 F.2d 1303, 1308 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1980).
17. Id. at 1308 n.13.
18. United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217
(1984); United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
19. Cincotta, 689 F.2d at 241-42; See also United States v. Demauro, 581
F.2d 50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1978); Gold, 743 F.2d at 823.
20. United States v. Bi-Co Pavers, Inc., 741 F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1984).
21. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
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acts of its agent in committing a crime involving criminal intent,
the acts must appear to be authorized by the corporate officers or
at least acquiesced to by them.22
Of course, in certain instances where corporate criminal cul-
pability is at issue, the court must assess the level of criminal
intent, i.e., mens rea, on the part of the organization either inher-
ent in an established corporate policy or the acts of its officers.
The guilty intent of corporate officers may be imputed to the cor-
poration, so that a corporation may be liable for certain offenses of
which specific intent is a necessary element. Such instances occur
where the crime consists of purposely doing the things prohibited
by statute, or where the crime involves knowledge and willfulness.
Corporate knowledge, in turn, depends upon the combined knowl-
edge of the employees and agents of a corporation acting within
the scope of their employment. A corporate. defendant is deemed
to have had knowledge of a violation of law, if the means were
present by which the company could have detected the
infractions.2 3
However, because of its very nature, there are certain crimes
which a corporation cannot commit, such as crimes involving the
personal malicious intent that a non-person manifestly cannot
exhibit. Nonetheless, even as to such crimes, where the facts of
the case warrant it, a corporation may be charged criminally with
the unlawful purpose and motive of its agents while acting on its
behalf within the real or apparent scope of their authority. 4 The
requisites of imputing an agent's criminal intent to a corporation
are essentially the same as those required to impute malice to a
corporation in a civil action, a cardinal principle being that the
intent must be shown to be that of the corporation and not merely
that of the agent.25
Thus, to a large extent, traditional law pertaining to corpo-
rate criminal liability has sought to define criminal intent under a
variety of factual scenarios. In-the process, one may conclude that
corporate criminal sanction traditionally has been warranted only
in the presence of respondeat superior, or where the corporation
acted wilfully, i.e., through the ratification of wrongdoing, or
where the corporation's behavior has a criminally negligent qual-
22. United States v. Wilson, 59 F.2d 97 (W.D. Wash. 1932).
23. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 739 (W.D. Va.
1974).
24. Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 1939).
25. People v. Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 161 N.E. 455 (N.Y. 1928).
[Vol. 17:47
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ity. The end result was to absolve the corporate entity where the
perceived equivalence of active participation in the criminal pro-
cess has been avoided or prevented. A more recent series of deci-
sions, however, suggests that courts are inclined to expand the
base of corporate liability by retreating from the rigid "active par-
ticipant" requirement and moving toward a less compelling one
that only demands a showing of mere negligence on the part of the
organization in permitting the occurrence of corporate
wrongdoing.26
III. RECENT CASE LAw & LITERATuRE
A. Recent Case Law
Recently decided cases have demonstrated that courts are
willing to go beyond traditional norms by attributing criminal lia-
bility to corporations who have failed to take active measures to
prevent violations of the law by their employees. These recent
decisions, however, have skirted the perimeter of requiring active
policing, and, instead, hold corporations to an industry-specific
"foreseeability-negligence" standard. For example, in 1991, the
First Circuit ruled in United States v. MacDonald & Watson
Waste Oil Co. 2 1 that a corporate president could be convicted of
transporting contaminated soil to an unpermitted facility.28 The
First Circuit declared that the fact-finder may draw an inference
that the president knew of the illegal shipment solely because of
his status as a company officer, based on the president's knowl-
edge of past violations and his failure to ensure compliance.2 9
In United States v. Dee,30 another hazardous waste disposal
case, the Fourth Circuit held the government need not prove that
the defendants knew their actions were criminal or that they were
overtly violating a statute.' Rather, the court approved instruc-
tions allowing the jury to infer willful "blindness," the requisite
degree of knowledge to support a conviction based solely upon the
defendants' positions of responsibility. The court also allowed
instructions that the defendants could be found guilty of hazard-
ous waste disposal violations as managers if the jury found each of
26. See infra text accompanying notes 26-49.
27. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991)..
28. Id. at 50-51.
29. Id. at 51.
30. 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991).
31. Id. at 745.
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the following: (1) the manager had a "responsibility relationship"
to the violation, i.e., it occurred in an area under his authority and
supervisory responsibility; (2) the manager had the power or
capacity to prevent the violation; and (3) the manager acted
knowingly in failing to prevent, detect, or correct the violation.
Additionally, in United States v. Bank of New England,
N.A., 32 the First Circuit upheld the conviction of the bank on
thirty-one violations of the Currency Transaction Reporting Act. 3
The Court arrived at its decision by declaring that the knowledge
obtained by corporate employees acting within the scope of their
employment is imputed to the corporation and that the aggregate
of these components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a
particular operation.34
Nevertheless, there was an earlier leading case which seemed
to suggest a departure from the traditional standards of liability.
In United States v. Park,s the chief executive officer, Park, for
Acme Markets, Inc., and later, Acme, was charged criminally with
the sale of contaminated food in violation of various Food & Drug
laws.36 In his defense, Park claimed that the corporate structure
of Acme was one of extreme delegation and compartmentalization,
which meant that daily activities escaped his direct supervision.37
Park conceded that he did not have any internal mechanisms in
place by which to monitor the occurrence of violations.38 In
upholding Park's conviction, the Supreme Court ruled that acts
such as the ones at issue impose "not only a positive duty to seek
out and remedy violations when they occur, but also, and primar-
ily, a duty to implement measures which will insure that viola-
tions will not occur."39 The Court reasoned that, without a doubt,
the "requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed upon respon-
sible corporate agents are demanding, and perhaps onerous, but
they are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of
those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business
enterprises whose services and products affect the health and
well-being of the public that supports them."40
32. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987).
33. Id. at 848.
34. Id. at 856.
35. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
36. Id. at 660.
37. Id. at 663-64.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 672.
40. Id.
[Vol. 17:47
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Regrettably, even these decisions and recent trend in the pre-
vailing legal norm have done little to impel corporate behavior
toward greater ethical standards. A simple hypothetical demon-
strates this unfortunate notion. As elicited above, federal courts
will hold a corporation liable for crimes committed by employees
while acting within the scope of their employment if the conduct is
intended to benefit the employer.41 Yet the inconsistencies in
such a rule become most apparent when a sole employee deviates
from the employer's carefully-honed internal compliance program.
In such an instance, the courts still hold an employer criminally
liable for criminal acts, even when the employee violates the
employer's express instructions in committing such acts.42 Addi-
tionally, prosecutors take this position one step further. They con-
tend that corporate compliance programs, however extensive, are
irrelevant as a matter of law4s and, therefore, as a practical mat-
ter, the company that guards against employee malfeasance may
be no better situated than the company's most delinquent
competitor.
Two recent cases highlight the disincentive embodied in the
foregoing hypothetical. In United States v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.," the defendant initiated an extensive antitrust com-
pliance program which had been cited as an industry model.4 5 At
issue in the case was the misconduct of one regional manager. 46
The Second Circuit determined that the compliance program,
"however extensive," would not constitute a defense for the
company.47
Similarly, in United States v. Rockwell International Corp., 48
after pleading guilty to double-billing charges, the defendant cor-
41. See, e.g., Bi-Co Pavers, 741 F.2d at 737.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d
656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990); United States v.
Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir. 1985).
43. Robert E. Bloch, Compliance Programs and Criminal Antitrust Litigation:
A Prosecutor's Perspective, 57 ANTIrrRusT L.J. 223, 228 (1988); Shenefield &
Favretto, Compliance Programs as Viewed From the Antitrust Division, 48
Amirausr L.J. 73, 79 (1979).
44. 882 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021 (1990).
45. Brief of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. in Support of a Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at 4, United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp, 882
F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1989).
46. Twentieth Century Fox, 882 F.2d at 658-59.
47. Id. at 660.
48. 897 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990).
1995]
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poration's pre-sentencing papers pointed to its elaborate compli-
ance program. The company asserted that it had distributed
codes of ethics to all employees, implemented an ethics training
program, developed a corporate ombudsman program, and com-
missioned outside auditor reviews of its compliance systems. In
fact, it was defendant's own voluntary disclosure policy which
helped bolster the government's case against its employees. Yet
the defendant corporation accrued considerably less benefit from
its compliance program, and the trial judge imposed a fine of
$5,500,000. 4 9 The results in these two cases reinforce the Misan-
thrope's adage that "no good deed goes unpunished."
The Sentencing Commission has attempted to foster effective
corporate supervision of employees by incorporating a simple
incentive into its penalty structure for organizations.50 Under the
Chapter Eight, if a defendant corporation can demonstrate that
an internal corporate program was carefully tailored, dissemi-
nated and enforced, that fact will militate against the size of any
criminal penalty.6 '
Clearly, the case law surrounding corporate criminal liability
has been characterized traditionally as endorsing punishment
where overt corporate violation of the penal code exists, where tol-
erance or ratification of the violation exists, where violations by a
corporate employee or agent under a theory of respondeat superior
occur, or where corporate control over the circumstances sur-
rounding the penal violation existed. Alternatively, a significant
portion of the case law has been devoted to defining that behavior
which rises to the level of intent, knowledge, or, at least, negli-
gence in the context of an entity-level violation of the penal stat-
utes. They also distinguish whether such conduct was performed
on behalf of the corporation or was made capable of being per-
formed significantly through the use of the corporation by the
agent. The writer submits that this type of emphasis in the courts
has not effectively guided corporate behavior away from criminal-
ity, further suggesting that the Sentencing Guidelines are an
affirmative step towards ameliorating such ethical stagnation
within the corporation while providing consistency to the applica-
ble body of law.
49. See Rockwell Fine Sends Message, Sides Differ as to What It Is, 3 CRnM.
PRAc. MAN. BNA 163 (1989).
50. See U.S.S.G. ch. 8.
51. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5().
[Vol. 17:47
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B. Literature and Case Law
As corporations have become increasingly pervasive actors in
our society, the issues of criminal prosecution and sentencing of
corporations have frequented much of the recent literature. There
are essentially two unresolved issues that have been the subject of
the traditional case law and which now predominate the body of
scholarly work. The first of these issues is the difficulty in identi-
fying, assessing, or proving criminal intent on behalf of the corpo-
ration. Criminal law has been reserved for intentional violations,
yet prosecutions of corporations have been marked by floundering
efforts to identify the intent of intangible, fictional entities.5 2 In
many respects, scholarly literature has parallelled decisional law
in attempting to assist the courts in establishing a hard and fast
rule as to what constitutes intentional conduct on the part of the
corporation.53 One author54 has proposed the use of a new "corpo-
rate ethos" paradigm in determining whether a corporation acted
"purposely" and, hence, whether criminal liability should follow. 55
The concept of a corporate ethos, or personality, i.e., in the same
context as individual personality, rests upon the aggregation of
those circumstances which gave rise to the criminal behavior.56
The author concludes that, among other elements, the firm's orga-
nizational structure, enunciated goals and decision-making prior
and subsequent to the criminal act, when taken together, must
demonstrate a policy of encouragement on the part of the corpora-
tion with respect to the complained of behavior.5 7 Thus, if the
criminal act was consistent with the corporation's goals and poli-
cies, that is, its "ethos", then this would translate into intent for
purposes of assessing criminal liability. To a great extent, this
author's proposals seem to have anticipated the guidelines set
forth by Chapter Eight, especially in the factors which the Com-
mission has identified in determining the "culpability score.""
52. Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence,
Retribution, Fault and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1141 (1983); Francis,
Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (1924);
Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and-the Corporation, 19 U. Pirr. L. REV. 21
(1957).
53. See Fisse, supra note 52; Mueller, supra note 52.
54. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability, 75 MiNN. L. REV. 1095 (1991).
55. Id. at 1121.
56. Id. at 1121-50.
57. Id. at 1112.
58. See infra text accompanying note 111.
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Chapter Eight's primary goal, however, is the progressive modifi-
cation of corporate behavior rather than an exhaustive determina-
tion of corporate criminal intent under a variety of situations and,
as such, represents a significant departure from the focus of
existing case law and related scholarship.
As indicated earlier, there is another concern which domi-
nates the literature. The second issue in the debate concerns
sanctions. In addition to proof of intent, a major distinguishing
characteristic of the criminal law has been the threat of imprison-
ment. Critics of corporate criminal liability suggest that because
a corporation cannot be imprisoned, the criminal law is not an
appropriate vehicle for controlling criminal behavior. Much of the
current literature on the topic has addressed the penalty issue.5 9
Recent scholarship has been relatively critical of the Sentencing
Commission's proposals, collectively portending that the Commis-
sion will fail, or, at least, be less than effective in influencing cor-
porate conduct. Specifically, Barry Baysinger60 suggests that the
Sentencing Commission's schedule of fines and its underlying
assumptions regarding the corporate world's reaction to height-
ened monetary sanctions is fundamentally flawed.6 1 The Commis-
sion, says Baysinger, presumes that as fines increase, the cost of
violating the law will motivate owners and their most responsive
managers to monitor and discipline lower level employees to
ensure compliance with the law.62 Baysinger is critical of this
approach in two respects. Primarily, and especially in the case of
the larger M-form corporations, the relationship between manage-
ment and the successive levels which exist in the corporate hierar-
chy become increasingly attenuated. Thus, the impact of a large
monetary fine is less likely to be translated to subordinates with
fluid efficiency, thereby diminishing the prospect for shifts in orga-
nizational behavior.6 3
59. Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a
Complex Triangle, 76 CriM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285, 288-93 (1985); John C.
Coffee, Jr., 'No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); John B.
McAdams, The Appropriate Sanctions for Corporate Criminal Liability: An
Eclectic Alternative, 46 U. ChiN. L. REv. 989 (1977); Richard A. Posner, Optimal
Sentences for White Collar Criminals, 17 Am. CaRn. L. REv. 409 (1980).
60. Barry D. Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 341 (1991).
61. Id. at 341-42.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 343-44.
[Vol. 17:47
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Additionally, Baysinger points out, the increased monetary
sanctions as prescribed in the Commission's proposals "could push
the total societal costs of white collar crime beyond the efficient
margin."" That is to say, as corporations internalize the height-
ened sanctions as "costs of production,"65 the result could be a
retreat from more ambitious areas of corporate activity, a general
fall in business productivity, or the "trickling-down" of the sanc-
tions assessed against the corporation to some group of dependent
persons, all of which lessen the aggregate societal benefit to a level
below that which is recouped through the imposition of a fine in
the first place. 66 This is referred to elsewhere as the "pricing of
criminal behavior."67
Another author, John Macey,68 concurs in Baysinger's allega-
tions surrounding the inefficacy of pecuniary sanctions with
respect to the corporation, albeit from another perspective, i.e., an
"individual-interest" analysis .6 9 Macey's "individual-interest"
analysis implies that the true criminal actors are those agents or
employees of the corporation who may be engaging in behavior
with or without a concern for the welfare of the corporate entity in
mind .70 The underlying theorem, therefore, for Macey, is that
codified sentencing instructions must be fashioned so as to con-
template the behavior of the individual. 7' Macey characterizes
the Sentencing Commission's Guidelines as simply "very high-
64. Id. at 363.
65. While, of course, discounting the magnitude of the fine by the probability
of detection and prosecution.
66. Id. at 341-42.
67. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does 'Unlawful* Mean 'Criminal"?: Reflections on
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193,
196 (1991); Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The
Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRin. L. REv. 513, 553 (1989).
Alternatively, several scholars have argued that the imposition of sanctions was
never well-placed vis-a-vis the corporate criminal defendant. They reason that
the defendant is disinclined to give deference to the relatively uncertain threat of
criminal sanction when balanced against the more precisely ascertainable risks
inherent in the marketplace. See Baysinger, supra note 60.
68. Jonathon R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 315 (1991).
69. Id. at 325.
70. Id. at 324-29.
71. Id. at 320-22.
1995]
13
Amoroso: Organizational Ethos and Corporate Criminal Liability
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1995
CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW
and apparently arbitrary-fine amounts."7 2 Macey indicates that.
the Sentencing Commission admittedly has based its fine schedule
on the generally accepted premise that corporations are risk-neu-
tral. He later argues, however, that the employees and agents of
the corporation, i.e., the true actors, are typically risk-averse per-
sonality types, which means the. Sentencing Guidelines, in their
present form, create an "over-deterrent" effect and are therefore
inefficient in a- fashion similar to that contemplated by Baysinger.
Of course, such critical theorizing can only be borne out over time
and with a witnessing of the effectiveness with which the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines are able to inspire corporate behavior.
C. Cohen's Statistics Leading to the Sentencing Guidelines
One author, Mark Cohen, in his study of the sentencing prac-
tice in the federal courts, noted that expected penalties which
equal the social costs of criminal behavior may induce corporate
organizations to comply with the law. In his survey of criminal
convictions in the federal courts between the years 1984-87,
Cohen concluded that mean and median fines assessed for such
convictions "seldom exceed-and often are much less than-the
total harm."73 In citing data regarding 178 corporate defenders,
Cohen found that the same was true of the total monetary sanc-
tions, which include fines, restitution and other sanctions but not
civil damages recoveries. In fact, in his 1989 study, Cohen f6und
that median of all fines levied against a corporate defender in
cases for which harm was actually calculated was thirteen per-
cent; the total fine expressed as a percentage of the total harm.
74
This may suggest that the offender may not be able to pay the
large fines commensurate with the total harm caused. The same
study reveals, however, that of 129 offenders who could afford to
fully compensate -for the harm caused, the "harm ratio" was only
twenty-four percent.75 Thus, the fraction of corporations which
were actually convicted and penalized were subjected to fines
amounting to only thirteen percent, and when factoring in such
72. Id. at 315 (quoting Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Sentencing
Commission, P.M. (Post-Mistretta): Sunshine or Sunset?, 27 Am. CRim. L. REV.
289, 322 (1990)).
73. Mark Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Study of Social Harms
and Sentencing Practice in the Federal Courts, 1984-1987, 26 AM. CRnM. L. REv.
605, 618 (1989).
74. Id. at 618.
75. Id. at 619.
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ancillary payments as restitution, this figure increased to only
thirty-three percent.76
Cohen recently has updated his study, indicating that more
recent sentencings suggest some increase in the severity of fines,
which Cohen suggests may be a reaction to the Criminal Fine
Enforcement Act of 1984.77 These figures demonstrate that the
base fine remained at thirteen percent of the total harm, while,
when including the ancillary fines, the harm ratio increased to
seventy-two percent. Thus, corporations that are caught and con-
victed are still being systematically fined for only a fraction of the
harm they cause.78
In his more recent study Cohen suggests that the relative
leniency in sentencing may be due to other mechanisms within
the judicial system which have served as a deterrent to corporate
criminal behavior, including a barrage of ancillary criminal
actions imposed on individual wrongdoers within the corporate
organization and ballooning civil damages claims which are
tacked on to already existing sanctions imposed by a criminal
court.79 Logical reasoning, however, indicates that despite such
alternative deterrence the findings of Cohen must nonetheless be
adjusted downward, for the following reasons.
First, the fines do not represent the totality of the harm cre-
ated. In addition to the tangible ,costs and damages which may be
quantified, there is an additional component to the harm element
which the body of criminal jurisprudence has long identified as
"societal harm." This has been loosely defined as the collective
societal anger and disruption caused by the offender's breach of
the societal compact.
Another factor suggesting that the results of Cohen's study
may be inflated is the fact that the actual fine assessed against the
offender must necessarily be discounted by the likelihood or rela-
tive probability of detection and conviction. For instance, if the
aggregate of fines and sanctions emanating from a violation
amounts to seventy-two percent of the total harm caused, and if
76. Id. at 618.
77. Mark Cohen, Corporate Fine and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing
Practice in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. REv. 247, 253 (1991).
78. Id. at 253. These figures are based on corporations sentenced for harms in
excess of one million dollars.
79. Id. at 268. Cohen states that in upwards of seventy percent of the
criminal actions brought against corporations there are corresponding criminal
suits brought against one or more of that offender's individual employees.
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the type of offense at issue is one in which the offender is detected
only once every ten times, then the true "harm ratio" is the sev-
enty-two percent discounted by the ten percent probability, that
is, a little over seven percent.
From a review of these unhappy statistics, one conclusion is
inescapable: any impact which the new Sentencing Guidelines
may have will certainly be mitigated if it is determined that con-
victed corporations are continually burdened with a sanction
which is but inconsequential relative to the harm caused by the
firm's criminal conduct. It is the writer's opinion, however, that
the revised fine structure of the new Sentencing Guidelines,
in conjunction with the "culpability multiplier"80 have, to some
extent, addressed this inconsistency and have further strength-
ened the governing body of corporate criminal law.
IV. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
A. Sentencing of Organizations
The United States Sentencing Commission (hereinafter
"Commission") was created under the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.1 The Commission is an "independent commission in the
judicial branch" and is charged with the task of establishing deter-
minative sentencing guidelines for the federal judicial system and
to "review and revise" the guidelines."2 The guidelines are "bind-
ing on the courts, although it preserves for the judge the discre-
tion to depart from the guideline applicable to a particular case if
the judge finds an aggravating or mitigating factor present that
the Commission did not adequately consider when formulating
guidelines."8 3
80. U.S.S.G. §§ 8C2.4 & 8C2.6. The "Base Fine" structure, when taken
together with the "culpability multiplier", has extended the outer range of
potential criminal fines to $290,000,000.00. Id. Of course, as the enabling
statute indicates, a court is always accorded the discretion to deviate from the
Guidelines if, in the opinion the court, such a deviation is so compelled by the
circumstances at bar.
81. As amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988).
82. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, quoted in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
368-69 (1989).
83. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367.
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The Commission enacted Chapter Eight in November 1991.84
The introductory commentary to Chapter Eight recognizes the leg-
acy of case law surrounding corporate entity and director/officer
liability in a criminal setting, namely, that corporations can act
only through their agents and generally are vicariously liable for
offenses committed by their agents.8 5 The introductory commen-
tary, however, also makes it clear that the purpose of this new
chapter is to "provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, and
incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for
preventing, detecting and reporting criminal conduct." 6
Chapter Eight reflects the following principles:
First, that the Court must, whenever practicable, order the organ-
ization to remedy any harm caused by the offense. The resources
expended to remedy the harm should not be viewed as punish-
ment, but rather as a means of making victims whole for the harm
caused. s7
Second, if the organization operated primarily for a criminal pur-
pose or primarily by criminal means, the fine should be set suffi-
ciently high to divest the organization of all of its assets.88
Third, the fine range for any other organization should be based
upon the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the
organization. The seriousness of the offense generally will be
reflected by the highest of the monetary gain, the monetary loss,
or the amount in a guideline offense level fine table. Culpability
will generally be determined by the steps taken by the organiza-
tion prior to the offense to prevent and detect criminal conduct,
the level and extent of involvement in or tolerance of the offense
by certain personnel, and the organization's actions once an
offense has been committed.8 9
Fourth, probation is an appropriate sentence for an organizational
defendant when needed to ensure that another sanction will be
fully implemented, or to ensure that steps will be taken within the
organization to reduce the likelihood of future conduct.90
Thus, by the tone set forth in the introductory comments
there is a clear departure from the traditional case law pertaining
84. U.S.S.G. ch. 8.
85. U.S.S.G. ch. 8, intro. cmt.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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to corporate liability. With respect to the legacy of the common
law, there are several significant and self-evident changes:
1. The basis for criminal liability has become more demanding
(i.e., a corporation may now be prosecuted for any type of crime,
regardless of the prescribed sentence, and may be decimated
with exorbitant monetary fines and sanctions);
2. The standard of criminal liability has also been modified, sug-
gesting a departure from the traditional prohibition against
overt criminal behavior to the affirmative requirements of
detection, prevention and cure;
3. The trend encourages, if not mandates, an objective manifesta-
tion on the part of the corporation of a separate and identifiable
internal organizational mechanism existing for the purpose of
detecting and preventing criminal conduct.9 '
Chapter Eight makes it incumbent upon the organization and
its officers to investigate the possible occurrence of unlawful con-
duct despite knowledge of circumstances that would lead a reason-
able person to investigate whether unlawful conduct had occurred.
This represents a significant departure from the overt involve-
ment/ratification standard to a duty to discover and prevent.
Chapter Eight, through its sentencing formula, makes organi-
zation "culpability" significantly determined by the extent to
which the organization has taken steps to implement an effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law.9 2 Such a program
has been loosely defined to mean a program that has been
designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be
effective in preventing and detecting criminal conduct. 93
Although the sentencing commission concedes that failure to pre-
vent or detect the instant offense by itself does not mean the pro-
gram was ineffective, the organization is expected to exercise "due
diligence" in seeking to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its
employees and other agents.94 The sentencing commission has
enumerated' several factors which are determinative of whether
the organization has exercised "due diligence," and those factors
are:
(1) The organization must have established compliance standards
and procedures to be followed by its employees and other
91. Id.
92. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5
93. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)).
94. Id.
[Vol. 17:47
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol17/iss1/4
ORGANIZATIONAL ETHos
agents that are reasonably capable of reducing the prospect of
criminal conduct.
95
(2) Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the organi-
zation must have been assigned overall responsibility to over-
see compliance with such standards and procedures.9 6
(3) The organization must have used due care not to delegate sub-
stantial discretionary authority to individuals whom' the
organization knew, or should have known through the exercise
of due diligence, had a propensity to engage in illegal
activities.
97
(4) The organization must have taken steps to c6mmunicate effec-
tively its standards and procedures to all employees and other
agents, e.g., by requiring participation in training programs or
disseminating publications that explain in a practical manner
what is required.9"
(5) The organization must have taken reasonable steps to achieve
compliance with its standards, e.g., by utilizing monitoring
and auditing systems reasonably designed to detect criminal
conduct by its employees and other agents and by having in
place and publicizing a reporting system whereby employees
and other agents could report criminal conduct of others
within the organization without fear of retribution.
9 9
(6) The standards must have been consistently enforced through
appropriate disciplinary mechanisms, including, as appropri-
ate, discipline of individuals responsible for the failure to
detect an offense. Adequate discipline of individuals responsi-
ble for an offense is a necessary component of enforcement;
however, the form of discipline will be case specific.
10 0
(7) After an offense has been detected, the organization must have
taken all reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the
offense and to prevent future similar offenses - including any
necessary modifications to its program to prevent and detect
violations of the law. 10
These steps also vary according to the following factors:
95. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(1)).
96. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(2)). This seems to indicate specific
endorsement for the establishment of a corporate ethics officer position.
97. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(3)).
98. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(4)).
99. U.S.S.G. § 8Ai.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(5)).
100. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(6)).
101. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(7)).
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a. Size of the organization - The requisite degree of formality of a
program to prevent and detect violations of the law will vary
with the size of the organization. The larger the organization,
the more formal the program should typically be. A larger
organization generally should have established written policies
defining the standards and procedures to be followed by its
employees and other agents.102
b. Likelihood that certain offenses may occur because of the
nature of organization's business - If because of the nature of
an organization's business there is a substantial risk that cer-
tain types of offenses may occur, management must take the
steps necessary to prevent and detect those types of offenses.
For example, if an organization handles toxic substances, it
must have established standards and procedures designed to
ensure that those substances are handled properly at all times.
If an organization employs sales personnel who have the flexi-
bility in setting prices, it must have established standards and
procedures designed to prevent and detect price-fixing. If an
organization employs sales personnel who have flexibility to
represent the material characteristics of a product, it must
have established standards and procedures designed to prevent
and detect fraud.'0 3
c. Prior history of the organization - An organization's prior his-
tory may indicate the types of offenses it should have taken to
prevent them. Recurrence of misconduct similar to that which
an organization has previously committed casts doubt on
whether it took all reasonable steps to prevent such misconduct
depending on the nature of the prior offense and its proximity
in time to the present offense for which the corporation is being
charged. 104
All of these factors are then quantified and incorporated into an
empirical sentencing formula.
B. The Formula
Chapter Eight's greatest impact deals with additional fines,
after restitution, for organizations whose primary purpose was
not to engage in criminal activity. The fine is a function of the
102. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(7)(i)). The Commission's rationale for
increasing the penalty with an organization's increased size is based on the
theory that as a company becomes larger, its management becomes increasingly
professional. Moreover, that increased size indicates a greater likelihood of
criminal activity pervading the organization.
103. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(7)(ii)).
104. U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. (n.3(k)(7)(iii)).
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seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the organiza-
tion. 10 5 Essentially, Chapter Eight prescribes that a base fine be
established according to the gravity of the criminal harm. 10 6 This
base fine is then multiplied by a "culpability multiplier," a number
ranging from .05 to 4.00, which reflects the degree of organiza-
tional participation in the criminal activity. 1 7 Thus, depending
upon the extent of corporate misconduct, the base fine may be
either increased or decreased by a significant percentage that will
translate into the actual sanction that is eventually assessed upon
the corporate wrongdoer. Once "minimum" and "maximum" mul-
tipliers have been applied to the base fine, the sentencing court is
provided with a range of fines within which it may derive the
appropriate sanction.
The seriousness of the offense finds expression in the estab-
lishment of a "base fine," arrived at by adopting the greatest of the
following: "(1) the monetary loss suffered by the victim; (2) the
monetary gain received by the defendant; or (3) a penalty deter-
mined by analyzing the Offense Level Fine Table."'0 8 The fine is
calculated by using the base offense level, with any adjustments,
as established in Chapter Two of the Sentencing Guidelines. 10 9
The fine range from the Table, before any culpability score is
applied, is $5,000 to $72,500,000.110 With minimum and maxi-
mum culpability multipliers of five percent to four hundred per-
cent, respectively, this Table range is effectively extended from
$250 to $290,000,000.
Regardless of how the base fine is calculated, this amount can
be either increased or decreased, based on an applied "culpability
multiplier.""' The actual multiplier, ranging from .05 to 4.00, is
taken from a Table of Minimum and Maximum Multipliers 112
which converts an organization's "culpability score" (a score rang-
ing from "zero" to "ten or above") to a multiplier number. 1 13
Every organization begins with a culpability score of five
points which may be subsequently increased or decreased based
105. U.S.S.G. §§ 8C2.4 to 8C2.6.
106. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4.
107. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4(d).
111. U.S.S.C. § 8C2.6.
112. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.6.
113. Id.
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on several factors previously addressed.1 1' For example, the score
will be increased based upon the judge's determination of the
following:
(1) The size of the organization: The larger the organization and
the greater the number persons it employs, the greater
number of points that are added to the culpability score; 1 5
(2) The extent of involvement of top officials: Clearly, the deter-
mination that top executives or other officers of the firm had
overtly contributed to the criminal act will add points to the
culpability score;" 6
(3) Existence of prior violations: A prior conviction, especially for
the same or a similar offense, will raise the culpability
score;117 and
.(4) Acts which constitute obstruction of justice: Should the corpo-
ration be found to have impeded the progress of the prosecu-
tion of the offense, the firm will be penalized accordingly.""
Additionally, the culpability score will be decreased based
upon the court's determination of the following:
(1) The presence of effective programs to prevent and detect viola-
tions: This form of organizational encouragement speaks
directly to the establishment of an active internal ethics
scheme as an integral part of the firm's organizational
structure;119
(2) The extent of voluntary disclosure to the appropriate
authority;
120
(3) Cooperation with an investigation conducted by the appropri-
ate authority: This mitigating factor, in conjunction with the
second factor, contrasts with the penalty exacted upon the firm
should it obstruct the investigation or prosecution of the
crime;121 and
(4) Acceptance of responsibility by the organization. 122
114. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(a).
115. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b). This reinforces the Commission's concern for
structural changes Within the organization.
116. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b).
117. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(c).
118. U.S.S.C. § 8C2.5(e).
119. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f).
120. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
121. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1),(2).
122. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(2),(3).
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Once the culpability score is calculated, the maximum and
minimum multipliers are derived simply by taking those multipli-
ers which correspond to the appropriate culpability score as
reflected on the conversion table.'23 A higher culpability score
establishes a higher minimum and maximum range of multipliers.
The maximum multiplier is four hundred percent of the fine,1 24
which has the mathematical effect of multiplying a fine by four. A
lower culpability score will act to decrease the minimum and max-
imum multipliers, which can have the effect of dramatically reduc-
ing a fine. The minimum multiplier is five percent of the fine,1 25
which has the mathematical effect of dividing the base fine by
twenty. Thus, the culpability score, once translated into a multi-
plier and applied to a pre-determined base fine, will give rise to
either a multiple or fraction of said base fine, depending on the
degree to which the corporation's behavior may be characterized
as nefarious or otherwise criminal.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has been written not with the purpose of explor-
ing every perspective from which the newly enacted Chapter
Eight may be viewed, whether these perspectives be grounded in
economics, management or organizational theory, or corporate
criminal jurisprudence. Rather, the Article canvasses these topics
for the purpose of suggesting what the anticipated impact of the
new guidelines may be, as well as to indicate those areas which
must be further studied and monitored in order to gauge whether
the purposes of the Sentencing Commission have indeed been
achieved.
The writer hypothesizes that the new Sentencing Guidelines
will assure that organizational ethics will henceforth assume a
more significant role in the conduct of daily corporate business.
The Sentencing Guidelines will provide consistency within the
body of corporate criminal law where uniformity was previously
lacking. They will guarantee that the establishment of internal
ethics mechanisms and strict compliance with ethical codes will
no longer be dismissed as "irrelevant" by the courts in the face of a
corporate defendant's genuine attempts to avoid and mitigate
criminal harm. Finally, by encouraging firms to actively detect
123. U.S.S.G. § 8C2.6.
124. U.S.S.G. 8§ C2.6.
125. Id.
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and prevent corporate misconduct, the Sentencing Guidelines may
have initiated a movement away from the traditional standards of
corporate criminal liability, which tend to exculpate the firm so
long as it has not overtly participated or even negligently permit-
ted illicit behavior. If this is so, perhaps we are not far from the
day when corporate entities are no longer perceived as nefarious
profit-seekers tenuously restrained by the outer boundaries of the
law, as they were so characterized by Mr. Friedman two decades
ago. 12
6
126. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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